sums of hypothetical money are won or lost, but some studies have used small amounts of real money). The player is never told the distribution of wins and losses associated with each deck, and instead the distributions are learned from experience. The same card sequence was employed for all participants.
The four decks are designed in such a way that two of the decks (labeled here as decks D 1 and D 2 ) are "advantageous", while the other two decks (labeled here as decks D 3 and D 4 ) are "disadvantageous" in the following sense. Each "advantageous" deck produces an average gain of $25, averaged across the 40 cards within a deck; while each "disadvantageous" deck produces an average loss of $25, averaged across the 40 cards within a deck. However, the payoffs are arranged and sequenced in a manner that makes it difficult for the player to learn this fact. The "advantageous" decks always produce a small immediate win of $50, while the "disadvantageous" decks always produce a large immediate win of $100. Thus the "disadvantageous" decks appear at first sight to be superior, at least with respect to the amount to win. But this is misleading because the "disadvantageous" decks also produce larger losses than the "advantageous" decks. The "advantageous" deck D 1 yields a loss of $250 once every block of 10 cards within its deck, whereas the "disadvantageous" deck D 3 yields a loss of $1250 once every block of Decision Field Theory 6 10 cards within its deck. The other "advantageous" deck D 2 yields five losses of $50 within each block of 10 cards in that deck for a total loss of $250 within each block, whereas the other "disadvantageous" deck D 4 yields losses of $150, $200, $250, $300, and $350 within each block of 10 cards in that deck for a total loss of $1250 within each block.
The main dependent measure is the proportion of choices taken from the "advantageous" decks as a function of training trials. A typical finding reported with this task is that healthy control participants gradually learn to favor the "advantageous" decks, but people with orbital frontal cortex damage persist in favoring the "disadvantageous" decks (see Bechara et al, 1997) .
Performance on the Bechara task depends on multiple processes including remembering past outcomes, learning long-term contingencies, evaluating immediate wins relative to the longer term losses, and finally choice mechanisms controlling the decision maker's impulsiveness and recklessness. Thus the decision-making deficits exhibited by brain-damaged patients may result from individual differences on any combina tion of the above processes. Cognitive modeling is helpful for sorting this out and identifying which of these processes are mainly responsible for the observed deficits.
B. Decision Making in Huntington Disease Patients
Recently Stout et al. (2001) examined a group of Huntington disease patients (N=14) on the Bechara gambling task, who had only mild cognitive impairment. This group was compared to a healthy control group (N=33) and a group of Parkinson disease patients (N=20). Individuals were excluded if they scored too high on the Mattis Decision Field Theory 7 Dementia rating scale (MDRS < 100) and they were also excluded if they scored too high on a Hamilton depression interview (score > 14). The average age of the Huntington disease patients (44.6) was less than the Parkinson patients (66.0), and the average age of the healthy controls fell in between (56.8). The average number of years of education was approximately the same across the three groups (14.5 years). For other details concerning the populations, see Stout et al., (2001) .
Huntington disease selectively damages the caudate nuclei of the basal ganglia, which mediates projections into the orbital prefrontal cortex, and so this group was expected to produce the same type of decision-making deficit as orbital frontal cortex damaged patients. Parkinson disease selectively damages the substantia nigra, which is the primary source of dopamine in the neostriatum. This group was not expected to produce the same decision making deficit as the orbital frontal cortex damaged patients.
As expected, the Huntington disease group chose significantly less from the "advantageous" deck in the latter half of training as compared to the healthy controls, but there was no significant difference between the Parkinson disease patients and the healthy controls. As can be seen in the figure, the healthy controls gradually learned to favor the "advantageous" deck, and to a lesser extent, so did the Parkinson Disease group, but the Huntington disease group decreased their tendency to choose from the "advantageous" decks across trials. The upward displacements shown at the bottom of the left panel indicate that the control group initially suffered large punishments early in training, and these gradually diminished as they switched to the "advantageous" decks. The upward displacements shown in the middle panel indicate that the Huntington group continued to experience large punishments throughout training.
The theoretical analysis presented below provides a way to identify the source of decision-making deficits in the Bechara task. A cognitive decision model provides a formal model of performance on the gambling task, and this model entails parameters corresponding to cognitive, motivational, and response processes. These parameters are estimated directly from the choice patterns produced by each individual participant, thus providing a distribution of estimates for each group. Finally, the parameter distributions are compared across groups to determine which parameters, cognitive, motivational, or response, are responsible for the observed group differences.
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C. Cognitive Modeling of the Bechara Gambling Paradigm
The first step in any type of cognitive modeling application is to compare and test competing models for the task. The best fitting model from this competition is then selected and used to provide the basis for parameter estimation and interpretation. The point is not to find a model that works, but rather to establish the empirical validity of one model over others. There are many possible candidate models of decision-making that one could propose and test for the Bechara gambling task. In fact, we have examined over ten such models 1 , but to spare the reader, only three competing models are considered here. These three models were selected for consideration according to several criteria. First, we consider models that have received some general support from previous research in the decision-making literature. Second, all of the models are simple and entail only three parameters. This is needed for efficient statistical estimation of parameters.
Third, the models must differ fundamentally in terms of their basic processing assumptions. The purpose of the last criterion is to avoid simply testing small variations on a single idea, and failing to contrast completely different ideas. Before introducing the models, some common definitions and notation need to be introduced. Strategy-Switching Heuristic Choice Model. One major approach to human decision making is based on the idea that decision makers employ simple heuristic strategies, and they learn to adapt or switch strategies depending on the decision environment and task demands (see Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992 , for a review of this approach). The following model is an application of these ideas to the Bechara task.
According to this model, the decision maker initially hypothesizes that the high immediate payoff decks are best, and thus starts with a tendency to choose from the "disadvantageous" decks. But after experiencing a series of large losses produced by the "d isadvantageous" decks, he or she switches hypotheses, and changes toward a tendency to choose more from the "advantageous" decks. This general idea is formalized as follows.
Initial Tendencies. The symbol p 1 stands for the probability of choosing from a "d isadvantageous" deck during the initial stage of training. Note that both "disadvantageous" decks produce the same immediate reward and average losses, and so we further assume that the two disadvantageous decks, D 2 and D 3 are chosen equally often (but see Footnote 1). Similarly, the two "advantageous" decks produce the same immediate reward and average losses, and so we again assume that D 1 and D 2 are chosen equally often. The free parameter, p 1 , must be estimated from the choice data.
Switching Tendencies. After experiencing a series of losses, the decision maker switches tendencies, so that p 2 = (1-p 1 ) becomes the probability of choosing from the "disadvantageous" decks at the later stage of training. The probability of switching Decision Field Theory 11 depends on the losses experienced by the decision maker from the "disadvantageous" decks during training. The symbol S(t) represents the sum of all the losses produced by the choosing from the "disadvantageous" decks up to and including t. The probability of switching tendencies on trial t, denoted c(t), is a determined from this sum as follows:
Equation (1a) is the logistic distribution function, which produces a smooth S shaped curve that is an increasing function of the loss sum, S(t). The coefficients, a and b control the slope and location of the logistic curve. These two free parameters must be estimated from the choice data also.
Choice Mechanism. The symbol, Pr[ D i | t+1] denotes the probability that deck D i is chosen on trial t+1. Figure 2 illustrates the choice process. First a strategy is selected with probabilities associated with the first pair of branches, and then a deck is chosen with probabilities associated with the second pair of branches. Multiplying probabilities along the paths and summing the paths that lead to a choice of each kind of deck (labeled "good" for "advantageous", and "bad" for "disadvantageus" in the figure) produces the following choice probabilities: total losses produced by the "disadvantageous" decks. Of course, it is possible to formulate other models, but we examined alternative three parameter versions (see Footnote 1), and this version produced the best results among the versions that we examined. We could also add more parameters to this model, but we need to restrict the model to three parameters for reasons mentioned earlier. First, fits to individual data do not support large numbers of parameters, and all the remaining models were also constrained to three parameters.
Bayesian -Expected Utility Model. Another major approach to human decisionmaking is based on the idea that people use bounded rational decision strategies (see Luce, 1999 , for a review of this approach). That is, they attempt to optimize their decisions under constraints imposed by human information processing limitations. The following model is an application of these ideas to the Bechara task.
According to this model, the decision maker uses Bayesian updating to change prior estimates of the payoff probabilities into posterior probabilities on the basis of experience with the outcome observed by the choice made on each trial. Using these probability estimates, the expected utility of each deck is computed on each trial. Finally, the deck that maximizes expected utility is chosen on each trial.
Probabilities. The symbol, P D (t), denotes the decision maker's estimate of the probability of a loss given that deck D is chosen on trial t. Bayesian theorists normally
use what is called a Beta prior distribution for estimating relative frequencies (see Berry, 1966 for a detailed presentation). Using the Beta prior distribution, the rule for updating the expected probability of a loss is stated as follows:
In the above equation, f D (t) symbolizes the number of cards producing a loss experienced by choosing deck D up to and including trial t; n D (t), symbolizes the total number of trials that deck D was chosen up to and including trial t; and f(0) and n(0) reflect the prior estimates before any experience.
2 Note this updating rule provides a computationally simple and intuitively reasonable model for learning the probabilities.
Utilities. On each trial, the decision maker receives a gain and possibly a loss,
denoted R(D(t)) and L(D(t)) for trial t, where L(D(t)) may be zero on some trials. The net payoff, denoted x(t), for trial t is the sum of the gains and losses, x(t) = R(D(t))+L(D(t)).

The decision maker's subjective evaluation of this net payoff, denoted u[x(t)], is called
the utility of the net payoff. In general, the utility function is a possibly nonlinear but mo notonically increasing function of the net payoff. A standard assumption made by decision theorists (see Luce, 1999) is to represent the utility function by a pair of power functions. This assumption will be used here as well, in which case the utilities of the gains and losses are computed as follows:
The exponents of the power functions, a and b, are parameters to be estimated from the choice data.
Choice Rule. The choice on each trial is made on the basis of a comparison of the expected utilities estimated for each deck, and the deck producing the maximum expected utility is chosen. The expected utility of choosing deck D on trial t, denoted Eu [D|t] , is computed as follows:
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Eu[D| t] = [1-P D (t)]⋅ u[R(D(t))] + P D (t)⋅ u[R(D(t))+L(D(t))],
To allow for occasional random guessing, it is assumed that the decision maker chooses the maximum expected utility option on a trial with probability p, otherwise guesses randomly among the four decks with equal probability. In sum, the Bayesian-Expected
Utility model requires the estimation of three parameters from the data: a and b determine the shape of the utility function for gains and losses, and p allows for some proportion of random guessing.
Expectancy -Valence Learning Model. The third model is based on previous theoretical developments that were specifically designed to integrate learning and decision making processes into a unified model (Busemeyer & Myung, 1992; Erev & Roth, 1998 ). The following model is an application of these ideas to the Bechara task.
According to this model, the decision maker integrates the gains and losses experienced on each trial into a single affective reaction called a valence. Expectancies about the valence produced by each deck are learned by an adaptive learning mechanism.
Finally, these expectancies serve as the inputs into a probabilistic choice mechanism that selects the choice on each trial.
Valences. The gains and losses experienced after making a choice produce an affective reaction in the decision maker called a valence. The valence experienced after choosing deck D on trial t, denoted v(t), is represented as a weighted average of the gains and losses:
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The attention weight parameter, 0 < w < 1, allows for the possibility that different amounts of attention are given to the losses as compared to the gains. 
If deck D i was not chosen, then its expectancy remains unchanged. This learning model produces expectancies that are a weighted average of the past valences. The weight given to each past valence decreases as a function of the lag (number of choices back in time)
of the experience. Recently experienced valences receive more weight than more remotely experienced valences. In the Equation (3b), the parameter a represents the updating rate ( 0 < a < 1). Large rates produce fast changes, strong recency effects, short associative memories, and rapid forgetting. Small rates produce slow changes, weak recency effects, long associative memories, and slow forgetting. 
The parameter θ(t) in Equation (3c) is called the sensitivity parameter. It determines the sensitivity of the choice probabilities to the expectancies. If the sensitivity parameter is set to zero, then choices are completely random and independent of the expectancies. As the sensitivity parameter increases in magnitude, the choices become more strongly dependent on the expectancies. For very large values of the sensitivity parameter, choice becomes deterministic and the deck producing the largest expectancy is chosen with certainty. We assume that the decision maker's sensitivity to the expectancies changes with experience. For healthy individuals, the sensitivity may initially start out at a low value, so that choice is almost random, but as training progresses, their sensitivity may increase so that choice becomes more strongly influenced by expectancies. Brain damaged patients may get tired and lose concentration as training progresses, and thus their sensitivity may actually decrease with training. This hypothesis is formalized by assuming that sensitivity increases over trials according to the following power function
Positive values of c indicate increasing sensitivity (less random), and negative values indicate decreasing sensitivity (due to boredom or fatigue). In sum, the expectancyvalence model has three parameters: one is the attention weight, w, given to losses as opposed to gains; the second is the learning rate parameter, a; and the third is the parameter, c, that controls the changes in the sensitivity over training.
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Baseline Model. In addition to the above three cognitive models, a baseline model was used as a standard for comparison with each model. The baseline model is a statistical rather than a cognit ive model, and it assumes that a multinomial process generates choices with constant probabilities across trials. The probability of choosing from deck D 1 is denoted p 1 , the probability of choosing from deck D 2 is denoted p 2 , the probability of choosing from deck D 3 is denoted p 3 , and finally the probability of choosing from deck D 4 is p 4 = 1 -(p 1 +p 2 +p 3 ). Like the three cognitive models described above, the baseline model has three parameters that must be estimated from the data, p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 . Unlike the cognitive models, this model simply assumes that the choices are independently and identically distributed across trials. Nevertheless, the baseline model is a strong competitor because it can perfectly reproduce the marginal choice probabilities, pooled across trials. Thus, a cognitive model can only perform better than this model if it succeeds in explaining how the choices depend on the sequence of trial-by-trial feedback.
D. Model Comparison Analyses
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. The three parameters from each of the four models described above were estimated separately for each decision maker using maximum likelihood methods. First we need to define the maximum likelihood criteria. 
The subscript M attached to the log likelihood, L M , indicates the model that is used to compute the predictions.
The three parameters of each model are selected separately for each decision maker to produce the maximum log likelihood (maximizing Equation 4a) for that individual's choices. For the baseline model, the maximum likelihood estimates are simply the sample proportio n of card choices from each deck for each decision maker.
For the cognitive models, it is necessary to use a nonlinear parameter search program to find the parameters that maximize the log likelihood. In this case, we used the NelderMeade simplex algorithm available in the Matlab programming language. This algorithm is slower than some other nonlinear estimation algorithms, but it is more robust and less sensitive to local maxima than other algorithms, which is important for fitting individual choice data. The three parameters for each model were estimated for each individual using this method.
Model Comparisons using the G 2 Criterion. The parameters that maximize the log likelihood for each model and person are used to make model comparisons. Each of the three cognitive models can be compared with the baseline model by computing differences in log likelihood as follows:
If the two models being compared were nested, so that one was a special case of the other, then G 2 would be chi-square distributed with a degree of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters. However in this case, the models are not nested and they contain the same number of parameters, so that standard chi square tests are not It is worth noting that although the expectancy -valence model was superior for all three groups, the fit of the model was best for the healthy controls and much lower for the other two patient groups. This partly reflects the fact that the latter two groups responded more randomly (reflected by choice probabilities closer to .50 in Figure 1 ) as compared to the Healthy controls, which makes their behavior more difficult to predict.
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E. Analysis of Parameter Estimates
The first issue of model selection has been resolved, and now it is appropriate to consider the second issue --interpretation of the model parameters. Recall that the Expectancy-Valence model has three model parameters: an updating rate parameter, a, which determines the memory for past consequences produced by each deck; a weight parameter, w, which determines the amount of attention allocated to gains as opposed to losses; and a threshold parameter, c, which determines the sensitivity of the choice mechanism to the expectancies.
On the one hand, differences among the groups in the updating rate parameter would indicate that performance deficits on the Bechara task result from the cognitive rather than the motivational system. On the other hand, differences among the groups in the attention weight parameter would indicate that the performance deficits result from the motivational rather than the cognitive system. Finally, differences in the sensitivity parameter would indicate that response mechanisms (recklessness and/or impulsiveness)
are responsible for the performance deficit rather than cognitive or motivational mechanisms. Table 2 presents the means, medians, and standard deviations for each parameter and group. The first column indicates the group, the next three columns present the statistics for the updating rate parameter, the middle three columns present the statistics for the attention weight parameter, and the last three columns show the statistics for the sensitivity parameter.
Note that the updating rate is larger for the Huntington group as compared to the <Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here> The differences observed in Table 2 were assessed more rigorously by computing confidence interval estimates of the group differences. The most important comparison is between the Huntington Group versus the other two groups (Healthy control and Parkinson groups). The Huntington group has brain damage in a location that was predicted to affect decision processes, the Parkinson group has brain damage that was not predicted to affect decision processes, and of course the Healthy controls have no special deficits. Table 3 As can be seen in this table, the difference on the updating rate parameter between the Huntington Disease group and the other two controls is positive (mean difference is +.25). The 95% confidence interval for this difference lies entirely within the positive region, indicating that the difference is significant. The larger updating rate parameter for the Huntington Disease group indicates that these individuals were more reactive to recent information and forgot remote experiences more rapidly as compared to healthy individuals. Or in other words, healthy individuals, and to a lesser extent, the Parkinson group, had longer memories for past outcomes as compared to the Huntington Disease individuals.
The Huntington Disease group differs very little in terms of the attention weight parameter (mean difference is +.08). The 95% confidence interval covers zero and so the difference is not significant. This indicates that the difference in performance on the Bechara task for these groups was not due to the Huntington Disease group placing too little weight on the losses, or being insensitive to losses as compared to the other two groups.
The difference between the Huntington Disease group and the other two control group s is most pronounced for the sensitivity parameter (mean difference is -1. No differences between these groups were observed in the attention weights for gains and losses. This suggests that the performance deficits do not result directly from this part of the motivational system for Huntington patients. Rating Scale (Mattis, 1988) . They found that only memory deficits on the Mattis were correlated with decision deficits on this gambling task. This finding suggests that learning and memory processes were partly responsible for the deficit observed with Huntington Disease group, in partial agreement with the present cognitive analysis.
5
Decision Field Theory 27 Bechara et al. (1997) also examined the relation between memory and performance on their gambling task. In contrast to the more long-term associative memory measure used by Stout et al. (2001) , however, they specifically examined working memory. They reported dissociations between memory and decision deficits with orbital frontal cortex damaged patients. One obvious explanation for these contradictory findings is that the neurological source of the deficit for Huntington Disease individuals differs from that for orbital frontal cortex damaged persons.
Alternatively, it may be that the relation between memory and decision deficits depends on the type of assessment tool used to measure cognitive functioning. If the wrong tools are used, then dissociations may be observed.
These examples point to a limitation of traditional assessment tools to uncover the source of deficits in complex cognitive tasks --the type of cognitive process tapped by the assessment tool may not match the type of cognitive process required to perform the target task. On the one hand, Stout et al. (2001) used subscales from the Mattis Dementia
Rating Scale that reflect long-term associative memory. On the other hand, Bechara et al. (1988) used a delayed matching test that reflects primarily working memory. Although both types of memory are probably involved to some extent, one type may be much more important than the other for determining performance on the gambling task.
The use of additional assessment instruments to decompose the basic processes responsible for deficient performance of a complex cognitive task is also subject to other sources of unreliability. First, complex tasks may well rely on the interplay of several basic complex processes, but measurement of those basic processes alone may fail to elicit a deficiency in the basic process which occurs in more complex circumstances.
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Second, ancillary tasks may be ineffective in explaining behavior in a central complex task because the range and degree sensitivity within the population being studied may vary dramatically for the tasks. This problem is especially likely when one task originated in the neuropsychological literature in conjunction with the behavior of people with brain damage and the other originated for research in cognitive neuroscience. Additionally, many ancillary tasks are quite complex in their own right, and the use of any single measure derived from a complex task may not be easily interpretable in the context of the basic process that it was chosen to represent.
Decomposition of complex tasks into basic processes has been a longstanding approach to identifying sources of poor performance on complex tasks.
Neuropsychological research has clearly favored an approach in which performance relationships across tasks are studied in order to identify possible sources of deficit that may account for poor performance in complex tasks. This paper outlines a potential alternative, the use of cognitive modeling. A primary advantage of the cognitive modeling approach presented in this article is that the model provides parameter estimates of cognitive, motivational, and response processes that are directly estimated from the target choice behavior rather than from ancillary assessment instruments that have ill specified relevance to the complex target task. In general, it is clear that the use of complex decision tasks to emulate real-world decision making has the potential to uncover the complex and fascinating interplay among various cognitive, motivational, and response processes. This is an area of intense interest to scientists and the general public alike. Much additional research will be necessary to flush out the advantages and limitations of using multiple assessment tools compared to cognitive modeling approaches to best discover how cognitive, motivational, and response processes interact in complex real-world decisions.
(1/10) .32 = .48 and ended at θ(100) = (100/10) .32 = 2.09. Inserting these into Equation (3c), this means that a valence difference of 1 unit favoring the "advantageous" deck would produce a choice probability for the "advantageous" deck equal to .62 at the beginning of training, and a choice probability equal to .90 at the end of training. For the Huntington patient group, the mean sensitivity started at θ(1) = (1/10) -.89 = 7.76 and ended at θ(100) = (100/10) -.89 = .13. Inserting these into Equation (3c), this means that a valence difference of 1 unit favoring the "disadvantageous" deck would produce a choice probability for the "disadvantageous" deck equal to .99 at the beginning of training, and a choice probability equal to .53 at the end of training. Note, however, that the expected valence for the "advantageous" deck is not necessarily predicted to be near 1 at the beginning for the Healthy controls, nor is it necessarily predicted by to be near -1 for the Huntington patients. This numbers were used only to illustrate the effects of changing sensitivities on choice probabilities.
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5 It is important to point out that while the present analysis provides converging support for Stout's initial finding that memory plays a role in the performance deficit of Huntington patients, the present analysis goes several important steps further. In addition,
we found that the choice mechanism also differed between the Huntington group and the Healthy controls -healthy controls become more sensitive to expectancies while the Huntington patients became less sensitive. Furthermore, we found no differences in the amount of attention weight for losses given by healthy controls and Huntington patients.
The instruments used by Stout provided no information regarding the latter two processes involved in the task.
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Figure Captions difference, shows the mean difference between the two groups, or in other words the center of the confidence interval. The left column, labeled "Lower Bound" indicates the lower bound of the 95%onfidence interval, and the right column, labeled "Upper Bound"
indicates the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval. 
